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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN CANADA
JOHN D. McCAMUS*
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Downsview, Ontario, Canada M3J 2R5

Abstract -To the surprise of some, the Canadian federal government and four of
the ten provinces recently have enacted freedom of information legislation. The
evolution of the new national Access to Information Act and its provisions are
discussed here together with relevant contemporary initiatives taken at the
provincial level. There can be no doubt but that the new federal Canadian
freedom of information scheme contains many features which will disappoint
those who have advocated legislation of this kind. Nevertheless, it cannot be
denied that the new Canadian statute, together with its provincial counterparts,
constitute important and hopefully irreversible steps in the direction of a more
open and accountable set of political institutions in Canada.

At first glance, Canada might be expected to be rather inhospitable terrain for freedom of
information legislation [l]. The federal Parliament and the legislatures of the ten provinces
are Westminster-style parliamentary governments. Members of the cabinet normally are
drawn from those sitting members of the legislature who belong to the political party controlling a majority of the house. Party discipline requires backbenchers to offer unstinting
support to the cabinet. Members of cabinet are responsible for the operation of the various
departments and agencies of the federal government. Thus, in sharp contrast to the divisions
inherent in the American separation of powers model, the Canadian system of government
places effective control over both the executive and legislative branches of government in the
hands of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. If the enactment of freedom of information
legislation in the United States is to be explained in part by the existence of tension
between the executive and legislative branches of government, such tension normally is
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absent in the Canadian context. Moreover, at the federal level, and in some of the
provinces, at least one or another of the major political parties has dominated electoral
politics for much of our re- cent history. For most of this century, for example, the
federal Parliament has been con- trolled by the Liberal Party, with infrequent interludes
of governance by the Progressive Conservative Party. Thus, whatever motivation there
might otherwise be for a party in power to enact public access laws in the expectation that
they might be of considerable use once the party again finds itself in opposition, also is
typically absent. For these and other reasons, it is, therefore, somewhat surprising that in
recent years, the Canadian federal government and four of the ten provinces Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Quebec-have enacted freedom of information
legislation and that it has been promised by two more-Manitoba and Ontario.
It is perhaps less surprising that the gestation of this legislation at both the federal and

provincial levels has been rather lengthy, notwithstanding the fact that the freedom of
information concept has enjoyed reasonably energetic support from a broad cross-section of
public opinion. No doubt influenced to a considerable extent by developments in the U.S., the
idea has been vigorously advocated by members of opposition parties of whatever political
stripe as well as by business and labour groups, the Canadian Bar Association [2], the
Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and associations of academics and public interest
groups of various kinds, including at least two that were created exclusively for the purpose
of promoting access laws. Although government spokesmen at all levels have suggested from
time to time that there is little public support for access legislation, it nonetheless remains
true that this idea has enjoyed persistent support from a remarkably broad cross-section of
groups and individuals. This fact, together with the special interest taken in the subject by
the press, has kept the subject on the Canadian political agenda throughout the past decade.
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Although academic interest in access legislation can be traced back to the mid '60s [3],
serious political discussion of this subject did not begin at the federal level until 1973. In
February of that year, the Liberal Government tabled in the House a cabinet directive titled
"Notices of Motion for the Production of Papers" [4] in which the Government adopted a
general policy concerning access to information by members of the House. Rather like the
American Freedom of Information Act, the directive adopted the general principle of
granting access to information unless the information came within one or more of the
listed ex- emptions. Unlike the American Act, the directive imposed no binding
obligation on the Government to disclose and made no provision for independent review of
decisions to with- hold information. Later that year, a Private Members' bill setting forth a
freedom of information scheme which had been introduced by Gerald Baldwin, M.P., the
leading Conservative spokesman on the information issue, together with the cabinet
directive, was referred to a parliamentary committee for its consideration. Referral of a
Private Members' bill to committee is an unusual step in Canadian parliamentary practice
and, therefore, was seen as a signal of serious governmental interest in the subject. The
committee conducted extensive public hearings. Interestingly, the Government tabled before
the committee a document pre- pared by Mr. D.F. Wall, one of its senior officials, titled
"The Provision of Government In- formation" which was a report originally prepared for
internal purposes, recommending the adoption of policies favouring much greater public
access to government records [5]. This, too, suggested rowing support for t he freedom of
information idea in governmental ranks. In December 1975, the committee tabled its own
report recommending the enactment of a
freedom of information scheme.
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The response of the Liberal Government to this recommendation was not immediate. In
June 1977, the then Secretary of State, the Hon. John Roberts, tabled a Green Paper
espousing the general principle that "assessment of government depends on full
understanding of the context in which decisions are made" [6] and exploring various areas
of difficulty involved in the drafting of a freedom of information scheme. The Green Paper
evidenced extreme sensitivity on the question of the review of decisions to deny access. The
discussion in the Paper made a noble effort to undermine the suggestion offered by many
others that the courts, as in the American scheme, should have the authority to overrule a
governmental decision to refuse disclosure. The essence of the argument made on this point
in the Green Paper and, indeed, by many federal and provincial spokesmen before and
since, was that judicial review of decisions to deny access to government records would be
inconsistent with
the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility. This was, and remains, an
interesting exercise in political rhetoric. Although there appears to be no merit whatsoever
in the claim of inconsistency, governments have attempted to defend their tradition of
refusing in- convenient disclosures under the guise of preserving our Parliamentary heritage.
The constitutional reality, however, is that the convention of ministerial responsibility has
nothing to do with the tradition of non-disclosure. On the contrary, the convention asserts
that Ministers of the Crown are responsible individually and collectively to the
Legislature for the administration of the executive branch of government [7]. The
historical significance of a principle rendering the Ministers of the Crown accountable to
the Legislature is obvious; it is also obvious, of course, that with the rise of political parties
and acceptance of the principle of party solidarity, the accountability of the Cabinet to the
Legislature is more a matter of
form than substance. Thus, more cynical observers argue that "ministerial responsibility" is a
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shopworn constitutional myth and that one of the very compelling arguments in favour of
freedom of information laws in parliamentary jurisdictions is that it would restore a measure
of that very kind of accountability that was originally secured by the convention of
ministerial responsibility. With the publication of the Green Paper, the question of judicial
review came to dominate public discussion of the freedom of information issue.
Ultimately, in December 1977, the Green Paper itself was referred back to the same
parliamentary commit- tee that had conducted the earlier hearings, for further study.
A related and very important development in July 1977 at the federal level was the
enactment of The Canadian Human Rights Act [8] which contained, in Part IV, a scheme
conferring broad rights of access to government files containing personal information as part
of a privacy protection scheme. Ironically, it appears that no explicit connection was drawn
be- tween this enactment and the general desirability of freedom of information laws. One of
the most notable achievements of the 1966 American Act had been the granting of a right of
access to information in government records concerning oneself. Consistent with the
views stated in the Green Paper, Part IV did not grant a right to judicial review of decisions
to deny access. Appeals could be taken by disappointed individuals to a Privacy
Commissioner who was given the power only to investigate and recommend disclosure,
the ultimate power to decide residing with the appropriate Minister. Nonetheless, the
establishment of a functioning access scheme for personal records must be seen as an
important step. Successful implementation of Part IV demonstrated that many of the most
difficult administrative problems involved in an access scheme could be resolved without
creating unbearable burdens on the various departments and agencies of the federal
government.

PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
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A number of initiatives were taken during this period at the provincial level. In March
1977, the government of Ontario appointed a Commission on Freedom of Information and
Individual Privacy with the broad mandate to make recommendations with respect to the
recognition of public rights of access to government information, as well as the protection of
individual privacy. In two provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, government bills on
freedom of information were introduced. On November 1, Nova Scotia enacted its Freedom
of Information Act [9], the first legislation of its kind in the Commonwealth. The Nova
Scotia Act was modest in its design. Rather than adopt the American pattern of a broad,
general principle of access subject to certain exceptions, the Nova Scotia statute simply
established a right of access to certain categories of information such as material describing
the organisation, programmes, or policies of a department, final decisions of an
administrative tribunal, and files containing personal information. Refusals to grant
access could be appealed only to the legislature itself, a body controlled, of course, by the
government that had already determined that the request for access should be denied.
In June 1978, however, the government of New Brunswick enacted a Right to Information
Act [10] which, in the American manner, adopted a broad principle of public access and
created rights of appeal to either the provincial Ombudsman or to the courts in disputed
cases. Given the nature of the debate at the federal level, the latter point was of particular
interest, all the more so inasmuch as the New Brunswick government itself had previously
indicated that it felt that independent review of decisions to review disclosure would be
"at odds with the Parliamentary system" [11]. Although enacted in 1978, the New
Brunswick statute was not proclaimed in force until January 1 , 1980. Since that time, three
judicial decisions under the Act have been reported, in all of which the requester has enjoyed
at least partial success [12]. The Province of Newfoundland, obviously much influenced
by the New Brunswick experience, enacted its Freedom of Information Act [13] in June
1981 to come into effect on January 1, 1982, in terms very similar to those of the New
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Brunswick legislation.
An alternative to full judicial review of decisions to deny access was explored in two of the
provinces. The Ontario Commission, after publishing a series of thirteen research papers,
produced its final report in August 1980 [14]. The report recommended enactment of
freedom of information and privacy protection legislation which would confer broad
public rights of access to government records and suggested that an appeal from a denial of
access should be taken to a Fair Information Practices Tribunal, with ultimate recourse
to the courts on questions of law alone. Similar recommendations were made in a study
commissioned by the government of the Province of Quebec [15]. Although draft legislation
has not yet surfaced in Ontario, in June 1982, the Quebec National Assembly enacted a
statute creating rights of access and establishing a review mechanism of this kind [16]. The
provisions of the statute creating rights of access have not yet, however, been proclaimed in
force.

ESTABLISHING A FEDERAL LAW
At the federal level, the leisurely pace of activity on this subject quickened during 1978 and
1979. The parliamentary committee, having again conducted extensive hearings, tabled a
report in June of 1978 calling for the enactment of a freedom of information law. In the
early months of 1979, The Law Reform Commission of Canada, a government advisory
body then engaged in extensive review of the activities of federal administrative agencies,
published a research paper recommending the enactment of an access scheme covering the
activities of such agencies [17]. Finally, in the spring of 1979, public statements were made
by the Liberal Government that a freedom of information law would be introduced in the
near future [18]. The promised bill did not materialise prior to the fall of Prime Minister
Trudeau's Liberal Government in the federal election of May 1979. The Conservative
Leader, Mr. Clark, focused considerable attention on the freedom of information issue
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during the election campaign and in October 1979, the newly-elected Conservative
Government tabled its promised freedom of information legislation [19], together with a
Privacy Protection Act which would have effected substantial revisions to Part IV of The
Canadian Human Rights Act. The Conservative bill was similar in its essentials to American
national freedom of information and privacy laws. It provided for a general principle of
access subject to a more-or-less recognisable list of exem ptions, together with access
and correction rights relating to personal information. Most importantly, the Conservative
bill provided for judicial review of government decisions to refuse access. Together with the
proposed legislation, the Conservative Government tabled a series of cabinet discussion
papers on which the bill was said to be based, and indicated that this kind of material
would be routinely made available under the proposed legislation. Although the short-lived
Conservative Government fell before this legislation was enacted, there can be little doubt
that the popularity of this Conservative initiative added to the pressure for some action
on this question on the re- elected Liberal Government.
Federal freedom of information legislation was promised by the re-elected Trudeau
government in the Speech From the Throne of April 14, 1980, and ultimately, on July 17,
1980, Bill C-43 [20], a somewhat reworked version of the earlier Conservative bill, was given
first reading. The passage of the bill through the House proved to be both prolonged and
controversial. Committee hearings which began in March of 1981 continued on and off for
more than a year and, in early 1982, it was widely rumoured that the government would not
proceed with the bill. Ultimately, however, after revising some features of the bill, C-43 was
enacted on June 28, 1982 and, although not yet proclaimed in force, it is anticipated that
once regulations have been drafted and appropriate administrative arrangements for
implementation have been made, the new Canadian Access to Information Act [21] will
be brought into force.
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THE NEW LAW
In its essential features, the Canadian Act is similar to American national freedom of information and privacy laws. A broad right of public access, in the sense of allowing
individuals an opportunity to examine a record or obtain a copy thereof, is conferred,
subject to a list of exemptions. The government is under an obligation to make
reasonable efforts to sever exempt from non-exempt material and to disclose the latter.
Requests for access must receive a response within a statutory time limit. Requestors may
be charged fees for the cost of reproduction and, in some cases, search time. Decisions to
deny access are subject to initial review by an Information Commissioner, but ultimately
may be appealed to the courts, although, as will be seen, this right is restricted with respect
to certain of the exemptions.
In contrast to the American legislation, the drafting style of the Canadian statute is rather
prolix. The Access to Information Act ultimately will occupy some fifty-odd pages of the
federal statute book. Further, there are a number of respects in which the Canadian statute
departs from the American model and offers some evidence of the nature of the political
culture within which it was produced. Thus, access is to be granted in either of Canada's
official languages in any case where a translation of the document exists or where it is
deemed to be in the public interest that a translation be made. Perhaps the most important
evidence of the Canadian flavour of the statute is to be found in the provisions
exempting certain records from disclosure.
Although the Canadian Act contains exemptions pertaining to international affairs and
defence, records containing advice or recommendations, material withheld under other
statutes, trade secrets and other confidential commercial information, solicitor-client
privilege, personal information, and law enforcement records [22], which are roughly
analogous to the first seven exemptions of the American Act, the drafting of each provision
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is less biased in favour of disclosure than the equivalent provision of the American Act. In
addition, the Canadian Act contains a substantial number of additional exemptions, some of
which reflect the peculiar nature of Canadian political institutions and some others which
appear to represent attempts to learn from and improve upon American experience with
access legislation. It may be useful to illustrate some of these points.
Quite apart from the exemption for material containing advice or recommendations, the
Canadian Act includes a comprehensive exemption of virtually all cabinet records, including
"memoranda the purpose of which is to present proposals or recommendations" to the
cabinet [23]. If broadly construed, it is obvious that the exemption of these records effects a
wholesale exclusion of material, whether or not factual in nature, related to policymaking
processes. Although cabinet secrecy is often defended in parliamentary jurisdictions on
grounds of high constitutional principle, it is obvious that this provision simply reflects the
desire of the inner circle of the government to immunize itself completely from the
inconvenience and potential embarrassment of disclosures under the access scheme. The
provision of the statute stipulates that the Act does not "apply" to cabinet records.
Accordingly, cabinet records are not subject to the severability rule. Further, under related
legislation, the government has given itself an unreviewable right to refuse to disclose
cabinet records to a court [24]. Ironically, in the course of introducing its new freedom of
information scheme, the Canadian government has enacted one of the most secretive
executive privilege rules to be found in the western world.
The Canadian Act also has an explicit exemption for material the disclosure of which
reasonably could be expected to be injurious to the federal government's ability to conduct
federal-provincial affairs [25]. As Canadian governments at both the federal and provincial
levels have long-established practices of secrecy with respect to federal-provincial dealings, it
is reasonable to anticipate that much information relating to intergovernmental contact will
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be withheld under this provision. Although federal relations in the Canadian polity are made
more difficult by the presence of a small number of very large provincial units and, at the
present time, by the fact that one of these provinces, Quebec, is governed by a party committed to the separation of that province from the federal state, it is difficult to defend so
comprehensive an exemption. Obviously, if broadly construed, this provision will permit the
withholding of a vast and important body of government information.
The Canadian Act also contains generous exemptions relating to government proprietary
information [26] which have no counterpart in the American legislation. This no doubt reflects,
in part, the much more important role played in Canada by public enterprise. Even prior to
the recent and substantial intervention of public enterprise in the resources sector, the total
revenue of federal and provincial Crown corporations had been estimated at approximately
10% of Canada's gross national product [27]. The most important of the federally-chartered
commercial Crown corporations simply are exempted from the new Canadian access scheme.
Those few covered by the scheme, however, will find that information which they would
normally treat as confidential will be quite adequately protected by appropriate exemptions.
A number of the exempting provisions included in the statute evidently constitute attempts
to learn from what public officials at least would view as deficiencies in the American
scheme. Thus, the exemption for law enforcement material permits, in the American
manner, the withholding of information the disclosure of which could reasonably be
expected to be injurious to law enforcement activities. In addition, however, the Act
confers upon the government the power to exempt by regulation the investigative records of
any law enforcement body [28]. It remains to be seen which bodies will be so exempted, but
it may safely be assumed that the power to exempt by regulation is the Canadian response
to the practical problems encountered under the American Act by federal law
enforcement and securit y agencies.
The disclosure of personal data concerning identifiable individuals is an obvious point of
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difficulty under a freedom of information scheme. The American Act exempts such data
where disclosure would amount to a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" and
thus requires a balancing of the disclosure and privacy interests arising in the context of each
request. The Canadian scheme approaches this problem by simply exempting almost all personal
data from the access scheme [29] and then by conferring on the government what is
essentially an unreviewable discretion to disclose personal data in the context of the new
privacy protection legislation. The Canadian Act thus has avoided the alleged uncertainties of
the American balancing test, but does so at the cost of transporting another rather substantial
percentage of government record holdings into the realm of discretionary disclosure.
Canadian officials often have been surprised to learn that information disclosed in
confidence by Canadian agencies to their American counterparts might be disclosed under the
American access scheme. No reciprocal difficulty will arise under the Canadian Act, however,
as a broad exemption for confidential intergovernmental disclosures has been included in the
statute [30]. The provision protects international exchanges of information as well as exchanges
between various levels of government within Canada. Again, this is a pro- vision which is capable
of shielding a vast body of information in a federal state. However, it will eliminate a practical
problem inherent in the American scheme which, indeed, has surfaced in the American case law
[31].
In its exemption for international affairs and defence, the Canadian Act departs from the
American model by explicitly setting forth the criteria for exemption in the statute itself. The
American Act, it will be recalled, simply exempts material which has been classified properly by
executive order. The Canadian provision is thought to be an improvement inasmuch as
disclosure under the statute will operate quite independently of any classification system put in
place by the executive or any changes made to the system from time to time. This benefit may be
an illusory one, however, in that the American system of classification and declassification of
documents has been, and probably will remain, more conducive to disclosure than the
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Canadian statutory provision [32].
A number of other minor exemptions could be mentioned, but perhaps the case has been
made that the Canadian scheme appears to have been drafted in a frame of mind which
essentially was sympathetic to past practices of government secrecy and confidentiality [33].
Accordingly, it may well be that the most important features of the scheme will be those
which create informal pressures in favour of disclosure. From this point of view, the office of
the Information Commissioner may prove to be instrumental in any success the new legislation
achieves in promoting the disclosure of government information to the public. Individuals
who have been denied access may request a review of this decision by the Commissioner, who
must in turn investigate the com plaint and make a recommendation as to whether or not the
record should be disclosed. Although the Commissioner has no power to order disclosure,
extensive investigatory powers are conferred by the statute, including the power to examine
any record to which the Act applies [34].
The role of the Information Commissioner thus will be very similar to that of the Privacy
Commissioner under Part IV of The Canadian Human Rights Act. The current incumbent of
the latter position, Inger Hansen, attributes much of her success in promoting access to the
fact that her incapacity to make binding orders has encouraged public officials to deal with
her in a more open and cooperative fashion than might be expected [35]. One may be
encouraged to hope, therefore, that the Information Commissioner under the new scheme will
be able to assist in the creation of an environment within which public officials will
generously construe the rights of access created by the scheme.
If the Commissioner's investigation does not result in disclosure of the requested
document, the disappointed individual may pursue further appeal to the Federal Court of
Canada. The Court does have the power to order disclosure, but the scope of the Court's ability
to review decisions to deny access is subject to two important restrictions. First, as has been
mentioned above, the Court has no power to review a decision taken by a cabinet official to
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refuse to disclose cabinet records. The Act is said not to "apply" to cabinet records and this,
together with the fact that collateral legislation permits a Minister to exercise a unilateral
right to withhold cabinet records from judicial proceedings, means that the government has
retained an unreviewable discretion to classify documents as cabinet records and thereby lift
them out of the statutory scheme. With respect to records covered by the statute, however, a
second limitation on judicial review is imposed. In the case of five exemptions -those
relating to federal-provincial relations, international affairs and defence, law enforcement,
the security of penal institutions, and the financial interests of the Government of Canada the scope of review is limited to a determination of whether or not the head of the institution
refusing disclosure had "reasonable grounds" on which to refuse disclosure of the record.
Thus, in the context of law enforcement for example, the Court cannot make an independent
judgment as to whether or not disclosure reasonably would be expected to be injurious to law
enforcement, but must defer to the decision of the public official in question if satisfied that
the official had reasonable grounds for the decision to deny access [36]. With respect to other
exemptions, however, the scope of judicial review is unrestricted and will operate,
presumably, more or less in the fashion that it has under the American Act.
An interesting feature of the procedures for review is that the Canadian statute confers
procedural and substantive rights on so-called third parties, i.e., private individuals whose
personal information is contained in a government record which the government proposes to
disclose, or commercial firms whose proprietary information is the subject of a proposed
disclosure. Third parties are entitled to timely notice of a decision to disclose, and may
intervene in or indeed initiate review procedures at the Information Commissioner or Federal
Court level. The exemptions for personal information and commercially valuable information
are mandatory in the sense that the government must refuse to disclose an exempt record and
third parties, therefore, have a substantive right to seek to enjoin disclosure in the Federal
Court. As has been indicated above, very little personal information potentially is accessible
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under the Act. Access will be given only to certain basic information concerning the status
of public servants and consultants and the identity of recipients of government licences and
other forms of largesse. Disputes concerning access to personal data, therefore, are not likely
to produce much three party litigation. In the commercial context, however, the prospects for
access are much greater and the likelihood of substantial third party litigation more real. No
doubt, the Federal Court of Canada will be called upon with some frequency to determine
the kinds of information which, if disclosed, "could reasonably be expected to result in
material financial loss or gain to, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive
position of , a third party" [37].
Apart from the conferral of access rights, the Canadian Act does impose affirmative
obligations to publish certain kinds of material or otherwise make information available to
members of the public. Again, however, the Canadian scheme is more modest in these
respects than its American counterpart. One of the great triumphs of the American scheme,
as far as administrative lawyers are concerned, is that it requires the publication and indexing
of the so-called "secret law" of the federal agencies. Under the Canadian scheme, agencies
are required only to make available at their headquarters any manuals used by their
employees in carrying out their programmes. The statute, however, does impose an
affirmative obligation to publish certain other kinds of information which will be of
assistance to individuals seeking access to information under the Canadian scheme. Indeed,
the rather ambitious requirement that government institutions publish "a description of all
classes of records under the control of each government institution in sufficient detail to
facilitate the exercise of the right of access under this Act" will impose substantial
burdens on the information systems personnel of the federal government [38].

OVERVIEW
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There can be no doubt but that the new Canadian federal freedom of information scheme
contains many features which will disappoint those who have advocated legislation of this
kind. However, given the structural realities of Canadian politics and the deeply-entrenched
traditions of government secrecy, it must be said that it is, to some extent, remarkable that
legislation of this kind has been enacted at all. Some will attribute this limited degree of
success to the power of a great idea, or to the continuing vitality of democratic ideals in the
Canadian political culture. Others, I suspect, will see the Canadian flirtation with freedom of
information schemes at both federal and provincial levels as enduring evidence of the profound influence of American political fashion on Canadian political life. Whatever its
political root, however, and despite the fact that the Canadian embrace of the freedom of information concept does seem rather tentative, the new Canadian statute, together with its
provincial counterparts, constitute, in my view, important and hopefully irreversible steps in
the direction of a more open and accountable set of political institutions in Canada.
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